In this paper, we analyze the effect of various collusion attacks on fingerprinting systems for compressed multimedia. We evaluate the effectiveness ofthe collusion attacks in terms of the probability of detection and accuracy in estimating the host signal. Our analysis shows that applying averaging collusion on copies of moderately compressed content gives a highly accurate estimation of the host, and. can effectively remove the embedded fingerprints. Averaging is thus the best choice for an attacker as the probability of detection and the distortion introduced are the lowest.
INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of the internet and consequent ease of redistribution of multimedia, intellectual property protection has become a challenging problem. Digital fingerprinting is an important tool for traitor tracing and copyright enforcement. A unique fingerprint signal is embedded in every legally distributed copy of the multimedia that can be used to identify the recipient. Upon obtaining an illegal copy, this fingerprint is extracted and used to identify the person(s) responsible for the leak. However, a group of users can mount powerful collusion attacks whereby the attackers try to create a copy ofthe multimedia that does not contain traces of any of their individual fingerprints. Techniques for systematic construction of fingerprints with collusion resistance have been proposed in [1, 2, 3] . Independent Gaussian based spread spectrum sequences are often used for modulation as they have been shown to have good collusion resistance when fingerprinting uncompressed signals.
In most cases, however, multimedia content is stored and transmitted in compressed form to conserve bandwidth. Consider, for example, a cable TV distribution service which has millions of subscribers. The service provider transmits video in compressed form to conserve precious bandwidth. To deter and. identify pirates in the case of illegal redistribution, finger prints are embedded in the video by the set top box However a group of users may capture and store the output of the settop box using devices such as Digital Video Recorders (DVR) and then collude to remove the embedded fingerprints On Emrail contact: {varna, shanhe, ashwins, minwu}leng.uud.eedu.
line music and video stores may also require fingerprints to be embedded in compressed multimedia signals.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of collusion resistant fingerprinting for compressed multimedia signals has not been addressed in prior work. Recently, we have shown that traditional independent Gaussian fingerprinting does not perform well for compressed signals, and is easily defeated by averaging and median attacks at moderate levels of compression [4] . Our results indicate that by applying Anti-Collusion Dither, the collusion resistance of the fingerprinting system can be approximately quadrupled [4] .
In this paper, we present a theoretical framework to analyze the effect of various collusion attacks on compressed multimedia fingerprinting systems. We first compute the probability of successfully catching a guilty colluder for various collusion attacks. We then examine collusion in an estimation framework and evaluate the effectiveness of the attack in terms of the Mean Squared Error of the estimate.
SYSTEM MODEL
The system model for fingerprinting compressed signals is shown in Fig. 1 (1) where D (A) is the maximum allowed squared distortion given the quantization step size A.
A group of K users Sc may collude and attempt to create an unauthorized copy V that does not contain traces of their fingerprints. The colluded signal may be compressed for easy storage and transmission. Let A, be the quantization step size corresponding to the compression of the colluded signal so that 1 § = TrIA, The attackers choice of A, is affected by the value of A. Choosing A, < A would not improve the quality of the colluded signal as the host has already been quantized with step A. Also, smaller quantization step size may not be effective in removing traces of the fingerprint leading to a higher probability of a colluder being property, and depend only on whether a belongs to the set of colluders S, or not. Dropping the subscript j, the mean and variance of T(&) for a g S, can be shown to be
lHere, the equalities follow due to the independence assumption and since the W (') are zero mean. Similarly, for a C Sc, we can derive the mean and variances to be
where Modneg represents the modified negative attack. Colluders may apply further processing such as adding noise or filtering which we model as additive white Gaussian noise, n, to obtain the attacked signal Z = V + n as shown in Fig. 1 .
Upon obtaining the attacked signal, a correlation based detector is used to identify at least one of the guilty users. Interference from the host signal is first removed by subtracting the host S, which is usually available to the detector in fingerprinting applications from the attacked signal The detector then subtracts the mean of the extracted fingerprint to obtain the test signal. The user q whose fingerprint has the maximum correlation T(q) with the test signal is declared guilty, *e q- setting of 75 as it generally provides a good tradeoff between signal quality and bit rate. Fig. 2 shows the probability of successfully catching one colluder Pd versus the number of users participating in the collusion for various attacks. The power of additive noise is set to be the same as the power of the watermark, i.e., the Watermark-to-Noise Ratio (WNR) is set to 0 dB for each of the attacks. From the figure, we observe that the probability of catching a guilty user is the lowest for averaging attack and the system can resist only 7 colluders with Pd I. The median attack is also very effective at removing traces of the fingerprints. The minimum and maximum attacks are less effective, and the modified negative and the minmax attacks are the least effective attacks.
Performance Analysis under Anti-Collusion Dithering: To improve the collusion resistance of compressed domain fingerprinting systems, we have recently proposed a dithering technique to make the embedded fingerprint appear more continuous [4] . The fingerprinted signal for user a is obtained as mum and maximum attacks has also increased. For the modified negative attack, the probability of catching a colluder is the lowest making it the best choice for an attacker purely from the probability of detection point of view. In the next section, we examine collusion from an estimation perspective and evaluate the effectiveness of collusion attacks in terms of the accuracy of estimating the host signal.
COLLUSION AS AN ESTIMATION PROBLEM
Collusion attacks to remove traces of the fingerprints can be considered as estimating the host signal, Sj, given the fingerprinted versions X(k) = + WJ(k), k k S, Let Fig. 4 shows the MSE of the various estimators as a function of the number of colluders for the experimental setup described in Section 3. From Fig. 4(a) , we notice that averaging collusion has the lowest MSE followed by median, minimum minmax and modneg attacks for fingerprinting using independent Gaussian based fingerprints and thus averaging gives the best estimate. Fig. 4(b) -xd ...X
